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Taking Corrective Action When Exposed to Fake News:
The Role of Fake News Literacy
Abstract
Fake news poses a threat to democracy. The rise of social media and its lax
content regulation have facilitated a dynamic environment where mis- and
disinformation are spread. However, social media is also the place where
false information may be corrected. Initial scholarly efforts begin to
highlight what is needed for citizens to take corrective action when exposed
to fake news on social media. This study is a further step in that direction by
introducing the construct of ‘fake news media literacy’. Relying on survey
data from the U.S. (N = 1338), we show that news media literacy in terms of
media locus of control and need for cognition might not be sufficient to take
corrective action; individuals rather need to develop specific fake news
literacy. Implications for media literacy initiatives are discussed.
Keywords: fake news, disinformation, news media literacy, need for
cognition, media locus of control

Taking Corrective Action When Exposed to Fake News:
The Role of Fake News Literacy
Since the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, ‘fake news’ has garnered
unprecedented attention from journalists, academia, and the public (Egelhofer &
Lecheler, 2019; Freelon & Wells, 2020; Tong et al., 2020). Although the effects of
disinformation on democratic variables such as voting are still primarily unknown,
there are concerns about the perceived influence of disinformation dissemination
and exposure (Jang & Kim, 2018; Weeks & Gil de Zúñiga, 2019). While
disinformation is not a new phenomenon (Boczkowski, 2016), the increasing
growth of social media and its lack of regulation definitely help the spread of
disinformation. However, it is also the place where fake news can be corrected
(Bode & Vraga, 2018; Vraga et al., 2020). Responding to the prevalence of
disinformation, recent research has explored ways to debunk false information
and discussed the problem with fact-checking, tagging and flagging fake news
(Andersen & Søe, 2020; Hameleers & van Der Meer, 2020; Oeldorf-Hirsch et al.,
2020). Unlike media censorship and gatekeeping which largely hinge on the
operation of media practitioners, corrective actions are behaviors that media users
can take as a reaction to the content they are exposed to, proactively voice their
own views, and counterbalance the effects of fake news. Key questions are
whether education and media literacy can be successful in preparing individuals to
deal with fake news (Bulger & Davison, 2018; Mason, Krutka, & Stoddard, 2018).
Jones-Jang et al. (2021) found that media literacy helped individuals to identify
fake news only to a limited extent, and argue that “as fake news stories resemble
the format of real news stories and are systematically produced and distributed,
critical-thinking skills of media messages may not be enough to discern real from
fake stories” (p. 382). Following this argumentation, in this paper we distinguish
between general media literacy and specific fake news literacy. We introduce the
concept of fake news literacy which we define as the ability to discern fake news
from real news. By using online survey data from the U.S. (N = 1338), we test a)
direct relationships between two dimensions of general news media literacy
(media locus of control and need for cognition; see Maksl et al., 2015) and fake
news literacy, b) direct relationships between both forms of literacy and fake news
corrective actions, and c) mediating mechanisms.
News Media Literacy
In the literature, a wide array of different conceptualizations of literacy can be

found. The notion of literacy has been expanded “from a narrow definition
identifying it with a set of psycholinguistic skills to a wider understanding of its
semantic content linking it to the particular sociocultural contexts within which
literacy is practiced” (Ranieri, 2019). News media literacy can be defined as the
ability to “access, analyze, evaluate, and communicate a variety of media
messages” (Ashley et al., 2010, p. 37). It is associated with individuals’
understanding of how the media industry works and the effects these messages
might have on them (Ashley et al., 2010; Christ & Potter, 1998). Scholars have
suggested that news media literacy mainly pertains to a news consumer’s skills in
navigating sophisticated information such as identifying information sources,
evaluating evidence, and identifying credibility of information (Fleming, 2014).
Beyond individuals’ education and basic skillsets, another key assumption of
news media literacy is individuals’ understanding of the media industries and
media effects (Christ & Potter, 1998). Maksl et al. (2015) developed a model, in
which three dimensions were found decisive in shaping an individual’s news
media literacy, namely, media locus of control, need for cognition, and news
media knowledge structure. The current study adopts the first two dimensions –
media locus of control (MLOC) and need for cognition (NFC).
News Media Literacy (MLOC and NFC) and Fake News Media Literacy
The concept of fake news is not new and it is not the first time that disinformation
is being disseminated (Boczkowski, 2016). However, the ease of use, free access,
and lack of gatekeeping mechanisms of social media have enabled both the
production and the dissemination of disinformation (e.g., Buchanan & Benson,
2019; Ross & Rivers, 2018). For instance, 8.7 million individuals were engaged
on Facebook in fake news stories while 7.3 were engaged with the mainstream
news during the election cycle (Kurtzeleben, 2018). Scholars developed an array
of different definitions of fake news. Fake news may mostly emerge as a form of
misinformation consisting of “posts based on fictitious accounts made to look like
news reports” (Tandoc et al., 2018, p. 138). Others have defined fake news as
articles that are “intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers”
(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 213). Scholars have indicated two factors that
motivated the production of fake news (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Tandoc et al.,
2018). First, fake news often contains outrageous content, which can lead to more
clicks, making it potentially profitable; second, particular opinion can be
conveyed via fictional information to strengthen one particular ideology and
attack or discredit others (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Tandoc et al., 2018).

The use of the term fake news is discussed controversially. While some
scholars argue that the term should be no longer used because the term seems too
fuzzy and its use might legitimate anti-democratic propaganda (e.g.,
Habgood-Coote, 2018), others classify the term as helpful because it allows to
draw attention to this phenomenon that should be continued to be discussed in
scholarly work (Pepp et al., 2019). In line with Egelhofer and Lecheler (2019), we
argue that abandoning the term from scholarly work might not solve the problem;
rather the term should be used with caution and not be applied vaguely to all
forms of falsehood in the news.
In the current study, we introduce the concept of fake news literacy. Building
on prior research on made-up news (Pew Research Center, 2019) and news media
literacy (Schmeichel et al., 2018), we define fake news literacy as individuals’
ability to discern fake news from real news. One key question of interest is
whether or not general news media literacy helps individuals to develop fake
news literacy. News media literacy has been shown effective in shaping a series of
psychological or behavioral variables, such as event knowledge (Vraga et al.,
2015), political efficacy (Semetko & Valkenburg, 1998), and conspiracy theory
endorsement (Craft et al., 2017). Moreover, studies have confirmed the positive
association between news media literacy and current events knowledge (e.g.,
Ashley et al., 2017; Maksl et al., 2015). Moreover, news media literacy was also
found to facilitate individuals’ skeptical attitudes toward news content (e.g.,
Maksl et al., 2015; Vraga et al., 2015). Scholars have suggested that an important
feature of news media literacy pertains to the ability of general inquiry and critical
thinking; hence, highly media literate individuals usually are skeptical of the
media content due to their familiarization with media practice routines, and better
understanding of the news production and dissemination environment (Mihailidis,
2009; Vraga et al., 2015).
Although a wide variety of literature has investigated the effect of news
media literacy on various psychological and behavioral variables, research on its
role in relation to disinformation is needed. Accordingly, this study aims to test
the relationship between general news media literacy (media locus of control and
need for cognition) and the specific form of fake news literacy. Media locus of
control (MLOC) refers to people’s self-perceived responsibility and ability to
control the influence of the information they consume (Maksl et al., 2015;
Wallston et al., 1978). MLOC initially stemmed from the overall internal locus of
control variable, which is related to the belief that one’s behavior of controlling
reinforcement will lead to rewards (Chak & Leung, 2004). Those individuals who

score high on MLOC, perceive themselves as able to control the effects of the
information they consume (Maksl et al., 2015; Wallston et al., 1978). As a result,
these individuals should also be more likely to detect information that is not
accurate. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H1a: Individuals with higher MLOC will show higher levels of fake news
literacy.
Need for cognition (NFC) is defined as an individual’s enjoyment of rational
thinking (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), and is regarded as a predisposition of mindful
processing. Scholars have suggested that NFC can explain intrinsic motivations
for critical consumption of news (Vraga & Tully, 2019). NFC-driven individuals
are more likely to process information through an “analytical approach that is
active, conscious, effortful, logical, intentional, and therefore more
comprehensive” (Austin et al., 2016, p. 601). Heijltjes et al. (2014) suggested that
NFC-oriented individuals were more likely to analyze issues and information
more critically. Moreover, Feist (2012) found that NFC had a positive association
with people’s interests in science, which they believed entailed a higher degree of
critical thinking process. Nair and Ramnarayan (2000) also indicated that
individuals with higher levels of NFC gathered more comprehensive information
on problems at hand and thus were more deliberate and efficient in
problem-solving and decision-making. We argue that NFC can play a significant
role in facilitating fake news literacy. Scholars have already demonstrated that
individuals who report higher levels of NFC usually process a larger variety of
arguments and they are more likely to identify heuristic biases in the arguments
after assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the information at stake,
generating counterintuitive insights in their cognitive process (Austin et al., 2016).
Therefore, we propose:
H1b: Individuals with higher levels of NFC will show higher levels of fake
news literacy.
Fake News Corrective Action
Corrective actions are reactive actions taken by news consumers to correct or
rectify the content they consumed and make an impact on others (Rojas, 2010).
Algorithms may partially explain how people are exposed directly or incidentally
to (fake) news (Scheffauer, 2021), but not everyone engages in corrective

behaviors when being exposed to fake news. Similarly, some fake news correction
can also happen via algorithms by identifying and correcting disinformation, as
well as individual behaviors such as commenting on Facebook or other online
discussion forums (Bode & Vraga, 2018; Rojas, 2010). Corrective behaviors are
reactive and are “based on perceptions of media and media effects, and seek to
influence the public sphere” (Rojas, 2010, p. 347). Bode and Vraga (2018) have
suggested that both algorithmic correction and social corrections are effective in
limiting misperceptions.
Fake News Literacy and Fake News Corrective Action
The link between media literacy and corrective action becomes obvious when
looking at an early media literacy definition: Aufderheide (1993) defined media
literacy as “the ability of a citizen to access, analyze, and produce information for
specific outcomes” (p. 6). This definition includes not only citizens’ ability to
processing information critically, but also to becoming active and creating
information themselves. When adapting this early definition to the 21st century
and specifically to the fake news phenomenon, fake news literate citizens should
be able to take corrective action when encountering fake news by creating content
themselves. Accordingly, the idea of media literacy as a central component of
democratic citizenship (Burroughs et al., 2009; Hobbs, 1998), seems to be
especially relevant when it comes to fake news.
Prior research indicates that news media literacy increases news skepticism
(Vraga et al., 2015) and political knowledge (Ashley et al., 2017). News media
literacy has also been found to negatively influence conspiracy theory
endorsement (Craft et al., 2017), Conspiracy theory, particularly flourishing
within the context of social media (Mari et al., 2021), is often initiated by an
overestimation of the political actors’ abilities, hence, individuals endorsing
conspiracy theory often lack deep knowledge of how media work (Ardèvol‐Abreu
et al., 2020; Craft et al., 2017). These prior studies show that news media literacy
could influence individuals’ ability to detect fake news since one of the first steps
to detect disinformation is to be knowledgeable about current events. In the same
way, those individuals who are fake news literate will be able to decipher
disinformation from real news.
Furthermore, this empowering role of news media literacy also holds true
in shaping individuals’ internal political efficacy (e.g., Ashley et al., 2017; Tully &
Vraga, 2018). Defined as an individuals’ perception of their ability to make sense
of or exert personal impact on the current political system (Semetko &

Valkenburg, 1998), increased internal political efficacy has been found to be
another outcome of news media literacy. Ashley et al. (2017) found that those who
exhibited higher news media literacy scored higher on internal political efficacy
as well. Moreover, combining an experiment and interviews, Tully and Vraga
(2018) suggested that news media literacy served as a significant antecedent of
internal political efficacy.
Both news media literacy and internal political efficacy share the same
psychological prerequisite, such that individuals perceive themselves as critical
information consumers and “effective participants in the democratic process”
(Tully & Vraga, 2018, p. 770). Similarly, those who have the perception that
they’ll be able to control disinformation will also score high on internal efficacy.
Individuals who are fake news literate might perceive that it is their responsibility
to minimize the impact of inaccurate information. We think this ‘empowering’
feeling would lead them to take action, in this case to correct disinformation.
Therefore, we propose:
H2: Individuals with higher fake news literacy levels will be more likely to
take corrective action when encountering disinformation.
News Media Literacy (MLOC and NFC) and Fake News Corrective Action.
Besides the effect of specific fake news literacy on people’s willingness and
ability to correct disinformation, we are also interested to see to what extent
having general news media literacy helps engaging in fake news corrective
actions. As discussed above, MLOC is the ability to control the influence of media
(Maksl et al. 2015; Wallston et al., 1978). Those individuals who perceive
themselves as able to control the effects of media might feel confident to correct
disinformation. With the increasing spread of fake news especially during political
campaigns, understanding the variables that may be able predict individuals’ fake
news correction behavior is important. However, since the relationship between
MLOC and fake news correction behavior has not been studied before, we pose a
research question:
RQ1a: What is the relationship between MLOC and fake news corrective
actions?
Similar to the relationship between MLOC and fake news corrective behavior
we were interested in the relationship between NFC and fake news corrective

action. Individuals who score high on NFC use an analytical approach to
information processing (Austin et al., 2016). As already argued, these NFC-driven
individuals might be more fake news literate as well. Individuals who are able to
detect fake information and are able to differentiate disinformation from real news
will probably have the potential to corrective action behavior. We can conclude
from the extant literature (e.g., Heijltjes et al., 2014; Nair & Ramnarayan, 2000;
Vraga & Tully, 2019) that NFC-driven individuals will have the ability to correct
disinformation. Individuals who are deliberative about their information
processing and are able to process a larger variety of arguments (Austin et al.,
2016), might be able to take action against disinformation when they detect it.
Although NFC has been studied in a variety of contexts, the connection between
NFC and fake news corrective action is not clear. We propose the following
research question:
RQ1b: How is NFC related to fake news corrective actions?
Fake News Literacy as Mediator
As discussed before, news media literacy has been shown to have empowering
effects. For instance, individuals who are more news media literate score higher
on internal political efficacy (e.g., Ashley et al., 2017; Tully & Vraga, 2018), and
higher political efficacy has been often associated with empowering outcomes
such as political action (e.g., Jung et al., 2011). Indeed, digital media literacy
activities have been found to promote online civic and political participation
(Kahne et al., 2012). We expect a similar mechanism when it comes to fake news.
More specifically, we expect people who show higher levels of media locus of
control and need for cognition to be more likely to develop fake news literacy,
which in turn should increase their likelihood to take corrective action when
encountering disinformation. Thus, we propose the following final hypothesis (for
an overview of all H and RQ, see Figure 1):
H3: The relationship between MLOC (H3a) and NFC (H3b) and fake
news corrective action is mediated through fake news literacy.

Figure 1
Model of News Media Literacy (Media Locus of Control and Need for Cognition)
on Fake News Literacy, and Fake News Corrective Action
Method
Sample and Data
This study uses survey data from the U.S. The online survey was performed by
IPSOS, an international polling company charged with the curation and provision
of all study’s subjects as contracted by the Media Innovation Lab (MiLab) at
University of Vienna. Data were collected in June 2019, drawing from a
stratification of 3,000 individuals in an opt-in panel of respondents to mimic the
US census in key demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, income, and education).
The final sample of the study yielded 1,338 individuals which roughly accounted
a 45.5% cooperation rate according to the American Association for Public
Opinion Research survey calculation tool (AAPOR, 2018).
The composition of this study’s demographic characteristics resembles quite
similarly the overall US census estimates. Also, as a mode of comparison, the
demographic breakdown of the study fits very well with those obtained through
random dial sampling techniques employed by Pew Research Center (Pew
American Life Project, 2018; for a detailed overview of descriptive sample
breakdown and a data distribution a full table is available at Gil de Zúñiga, et al.,
2021).
Measures
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and reliability scores for key measures. For
constructs that consist of three or more items, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated.

For constructs that consist of only two items, Spearman-Brown Coefficient was
calculated (Eisinga et al., 2013). Most of our variables met the common threshold
of .70 (Streiner, 2003). Only two variables showed slightly lower coefficient –
media locus of control (.61) and fake news corrective action (.65). Since prior
research validated the construct media locus of control (α = .61 Ku et al., 2019; α
= .64 McWorther, 2020, p. 150), we built on the same measurement instrument,
reaching a very similar coefficient. For fake news corrective action, a coefficient
close to .70 can be deemed acceptable, since it is a newly developed scale which
is highly useful and can be further improved in future studies (Taber, 2018).
Fake News Literacy. Building on prior research on made-up news (Pew
Research Center, 2019) and news media literacy (Schmeichel et al., 2018), we
formulated the following three statements and asked respondents how much they
agree or disagree (1 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree): ‘Generally, I am
able to discern fake news from real news’; ‘Most of the time, when I see fake
news, I am able to detect them easily’; ‘It is very unlikely that a piece of fake
news can mislead me’. The three items were averaged to create the final variable
(Cronbach’s alpha = .86; M = 6.54; SD = 2.06).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability
Variable
Number MI MAX
M (SD)
of Items
N
Fake New Literacy
3
1
10
6.54 (2.06)
Fake News Corrective Action
2
1
10
5.49 (2.61)
Fake News Exposure
3
1
10
6.04 (2.32)
Media Locus of Control
3
1
10
5.66 (1.97)
Need for Cognition
3
1
10
7.02 (2.39)
Traditional News Use
8
1
10
4.47 (2.12)
Social Media News Use
2
1
10
4.49 (3.01)
Political Ideology
2
1
11
6.46 (2.80)
Political Interest
2
1
10
6.13 (2.72)
Political Knowledge
8
0
8
2.77 (2.03)
Notes. Cell entries are means (M), standard deviations (SD), and Cronbach’s
alpha (α). For constructs that consist of only two items, Spearman-Brown
Coefficient was calculated.

α
.86
.65
.88
.61
.85
.82
.86
.92
.94
.71

Fake News Corrective Action. Respondents were asked how much they
agree or disagree (1 = strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree) with the following
statements: ‘When I clearly identify fake news, I tend to report it’ and ‘When a
person forwards or shares information that I clearly identify as fake news, I will
make them aware of the false information’. The two items were averaged
(Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .65; M = 5.49; SD = 2.61).
Following Maksl et al. (2015), news media literacy was measured by using
two dimensions - need for cognition and media locus of control.
Need for Cognition. Participants were asked to respond to three items
(Maksl et al., 2015; Vraga & Tully, 2019), how much they agree or disagree (1 =
strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree) with the following statements: ‘I don’t like
to have to do a lot of thinking’ (recoded); ‘I try to avoid situations that require
thinking in depth about something’ (recoded); ‘Thinking hard and for a long time
about something gives me little satisfaction’ (recoded) (Cronbach’s alpha = .85; M
= 7.02; SD = 2.39).
Media Locus of Control. Similarly, for media locus of control (Maksl et
al., 2015) we asked respondents to respond to how much they agree or disagree (1
= strongly disagree; 10 = strongly agree) with the following statements: ‘If I am
misinformed by the news media, it is my own behavior that determines how soon
I will learn credible information’; ‘I am in control of the information I get from
the news media’; ‘When I am misinformed by the news media, I am to blame’.
(Cronbach’s alpha = .61; M = 5.66; SD = 1.97).
Fake News Exposure. Based on definitions of fake news (Egelhofer &
Lecheler, 2019), respondents were asked how often (1 = never; 10 = all the time)
they think they see a) fabricated information that mimics news media content and
could mislead readers, b) articles that originate from satirical websites but were
transformed by others and put in a misleading context, and c) stories containing
deliberatively misleading elements making the reader believe it is correct. The
three items were average to create the final variable (also see Gil de Zúñiga, et al.,
in press) (Cronbach’s alpha = .98; M = 6.04; SD = 2.32).
Social Media News Use. We asked respondents how often in the past
month they did get a) local news on social media, and b) national news on social
media (Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .86; M = 4.49; SD = 3.01).
Traditional News Use. For traditional news use (e.g., Borah et al., 2013)
we asked respondents how often in the past month they did get news from the
following media sources: a) Network TV news (e.g., ABC, CBS, NBC), b) Local
television news (cf. local affiliate stations), c) National newspapers (e.g., New

York Times, Washington Post, USA Today), d) Local newspapers (e.g., Oregonian,
Houston Chronicle, The Miami Herald), e) MSNBC cable news, f) CNN cable
news, g) FOX news, h) Radio news (e.g., NPR, talk shows). The eight items were
averaged (Cronbach’s alpha = .82; M = 4.47; SD = 2.12).
Political Ideology. We asked respondents where they would place
themselves on a scale of 0-10, where 10 = Strong conservative and 0 = Strong
liberal on a) political issues and b) on economic issues (Spearman- Brown
Coefficient = .92; M = 6.46; SD = 2.80).
Political Interest. People were asked a) how interested they are in
information about what’s going on in politics and public affairs, and b) how
closely they pay attention to information about what's going on in politics and
public affairs (1 = not at all; 10 = a great deal). The two items were averaged to
create the final variables (Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .94; M = 6.13; SD =
2.72).
Political Knowledge. We used eight questions to assess respondents’
political knowledge. We asked, for example: ‘What job or political office does
Mike Pence currently hold?’, ‘For how many years is a United States Senator
elected – that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S.
Senator?’, ‘On which of the following does the U.S. federal government currently
spend the least?’. Items were recoded 0 = incorrect or don’t know; 1 = correct
(KR 20 = .71; M = 2.77; SD = 2.03).
Demographics. We control for the following demographic variables: Age
(18-22 years: 7.1%; 23-35: 25.2%; 36-55: 39.7%; 56 or older: 28%), gender (53.2
% female), education (measured on an eight-point scale where 1 = less than high
school and 8 = doctoral degree; M = 3.7, SD = 1.92), income (annual household
income where 1 = 0 to 14,999 and 7 = 2000,000 or more; M = 3.6, SD = 1.47),
and ethnicity or race (75.2% majority).
Analysis
To test the first set of hypotheses and answer our first set of research questions,
we run hierarchical OLS regressions. Furthermore, we employed Structural
Equation Modeling (SEM) using Mplus to investigate mediating mechanisms and
to test how all the variables relate to one another.
Results
First, we tested the relationship between general news media literacy and fake
news literacy. Results from regression analysis in Table 2 show that both

dimensions of news media literacy – media locus of control (β = .200, p < .001)
and need for cognition (β = .071, p < .05) – are positively related to fake news
literacy. Hence, our data support H1a and H1b.
Table 2
OLS Regression Model Predicting Fake News Literacy and Fake News Corrective Action
Fake News
Fake News
Literacy
Corrective Action
Block1: Demographics
Age
Gender (Female=1)
Education
Income
Race (Majority=1)
ΔR2

-.087**
-.038
-.044
.034
.030
2.9%

-.101***
.027
.033
-.052
-.029
2.5%

Block 2: Political Antecedents
Political Ideology
Political Interest
Political Knowledge
ΔR2

-.004
.280***
.051
14.4%

-.049
.092**
.003
9.0%

Block 3: News Use
Traditional News Use
Social Media News Use
Fake News Exposure
ΔR2

.001
.094**
.160***
4.6%

.128***
.048
.160***
8.5%

Block 5: News Media Literacy
Media Locus of Control
Need for Cognition
Fake New Literacy
ΔR2

.200***
.071*
--3.3%

.049
-.024
.302***
7.9%

24.4%

27.0%

Total R2

Note. N = 1,336. Cell entries are final-entry ordinary least squares (OLS) standardized
coefficients (β). *p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Next, results in Table 2 reveal that fake news literacy is positively associated with
fake news corrective action (β = .302, p < .001). That is, people who are more
fake news literate are more likely to take corrective action when encountering
disinformation. These results confirm H2.
RQ1a-b asked if general news media literacy helps taking corrective
action. Results in Table 2 indicate that this is not the case: Neither media locus of
control (β = .049, n.s.) nor need for cognition (β = -.024, n.s.) are directly related
to fake news corrective action. To test whether MLOC and NFC are indirectly
related to fake news corrective action through fake news literacy, SEM was used
(χ2 = 0.71; df = 1; p = .40; RMSEA = .001, CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.000, SRMR
= .006) with fake news literacy (R2 = 4.2%) and fake news corrective action (R2
= 9.9%) as criterion variables. The model shows that both MLOC and NFC are
indirectly related to fake news corrective action. The indirect effects are reported
in Table 3.
Table 3
Indirect Effects on Fake News Corrective Action
Indirect Effects
Media Locus Control → Fake News Literacy → Fake News Corrective
Action
Need for Cognition → Fake News Literacy → Fake News Corrective

B
.063***
.021*

Action
Note. N = 1225. Standardized SEM coefficients (Betas) reported. * p < .05; ** p < .01;
*** p < .001

Results reveal that the relationship between MLOC and fake news corrective
action is mediated through fake news literacy (β = .063, p < .001). Similarly, the
relationship between NFC and fake news corrective action is mediated through
fake news literacy (β = .021, p < .05). These results support H3a and H3b. That is,
people who are more news media literate (i.e., higher MLOC and NFC) are more
likely to develop specific fake news literacy, which in turn enhances the
likelihood to take corrective action when encountering fake news.

Figure 2
Fixed Effects Structural Equation Model News Media Literacy (Media Locus of
Control and Need for Cognition) on Fake News Literacy, and Fake News
Corrective Action
Note. N = 1225. Path entries are standardized SEM coefficients (Betas) at p <.05 or better.
Dashed paths indicate non-signiﬁcant relationships. The effects of demographics (age,
gender, education, income, and race), political antecedents (political ideology, political
interest, political knowledge), and news use (traditional news use, social media news use,
fake news exposure) have been residualized in the model. Maximum-likelihood
estimation. Exogenous variables were brought into the model by mentioning their
variances in the MODEL command. Model goodness of fit: χ2 = 0.71; df = 1; p = .40;
RMSEA = .001, CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.000, SRMR = .006). Incremental explained
variance of criterion variables beyond controls: Fake News Literacy R2 = 4.2%; Fake
News Corrective Action R2 = 9.9%.

Discussion
The primary aim of this study was to investigate whether or not news media
literacy can facilitate corrective action when individuals encounter disinformation.
To do so we included two dimensions of news media literacy in our analysis
(Maksl et al., 2015), namely media locus of control and need for cognition.
Our results highlight the importance of developing fake news literacy for
taking corrective action when encountering disinformation. While we found no
direct relationship between need for cognition and fake news corrective action,
there is an indirect relationship mediated through fake news literacy. This is in
line with recent findings from Jones-Jang and colleagues (2021) showing that
neither general media literacy, nor news literacy or digital literacy is significantly
related to accurate identification of fake information. This has important
implications for media literacy education in the era of post-truth (Friesem &
Friesem, 2021). While it is certainly helpful to foster people’s general media news
literacy skills, when it comes to disinformation, fostering specific fake news
literacy skills is crucial since only fake news literacy skills will enable individuals
to engage in corrective actions.
Another relevant finding is that younger people are more likely to correct
fake news. This makes perfect sense since recent research shows that older people
are more likely to share fake news (Guess et al., 2019). They found that people
over 65 shared nearly seven times as many articles from fake news domains
compared to the younger age group. Accordingly, news media literacy initiatives
should specifically address older individuals with their fake news literacy
information. To do so, more research is needed on older adults’ skills related to
Internet use (Hargittai et al., 2018).
Moreover, our results indicate that individuals who consume traditional
news are more likely to take corrective action. This finding points out the crucial
role of reading newspapers, listening to radio news shows and watching TV news.
Those who follow news on traditional media channels are better equipped to
combat disinformation; this seems plausible given that they can compare the
disinformation with the information they encountered in traditional news. Hence,
it should be easier for them to detect disinformation and correct it by using
information they got from traditional news use.
As with all research, the current study does not come without limitations.
One limitation concerns our measurement of general news media literacy; we
were only able to include two of the three dimensions developed by Maksl et al.
(2015). Future studies should also apply the third dimension (i.e., knowledge

structures) in order to test whether knowledge about the production of news
fosters developing fake news literacy. Similarly, future studies should take into
account information literacy (Livingstone et al., 2008) – a concept that has
recently been found to help people identifying fake information (Jones-Jang et al.,
2021).
Another limitation is that our measurement of fake news literacy is based
on self-perceived literacy. Future studies should also measure fake news literacy
in terms of knowledge items on production and effects of fake news and
differentiate between different platforms where disinformation is shared. While
this study focused on general social media as a space where disinformation highly
circulates these days (Shu et al., 2020), future studies should take into account
other channels and specific forms of disinformation (e.g., political advertising)
and also differentiate between different types of social media platforms. For
instance, one platform where fake news is circulated heavily and that is only
starting to get scholarly attention is WhatsApp (e.g., Canavilhas et al., 2019;
Valenzuela et al., 2019). Research is needed to understand how engaging in
corrective actions works in private communication spaces where
non-informational motives such as sending eye-catching messages and interacting
with friends are decisive for sharing misinformation (Chen et al., 2015). Further,
information verification literature indicates that self‐reported and actual
evaluation behavior might differ (Metzger, 2007). Hence, experimental research is
needed to investigate how individuals with different levels of fake news literacy
act when exposed to disinformation. In this regard, recent research highlights the
need to take into account the role of media literacy interventions, warnings about
misleading information on social media and fact check tags (Clayton et al., 2019;
Geers, Boukes, & Moeller, 2020; Tully et al., 2020a). Another interesting question
for future research is to what extent seeing other people taking corrective action
when encountering disinformation motivates (bandwagon-effect) or demotivates
(bystander theory) other users in taking corrective actions themselves (for an
overview of both directions, see Tully et al., 2020b).
Further, this study relies on single national data; cross-cultural research is
needed to shed light on exposure to disinformation and the development of fake
news literacy in different countries. Media literacy can be seen as “a social,
locally situated process, with individuals facing different sets of barriers with
regard to their ability to develop the skills and competencies required to use
different types of electronic services” (Sourbati, 2009, p. 254), and research
suggests that disinformation and fake news practices are also shaped by national

information environments (Bennett & Livingston, 2018; & Lin, 2020; Humprecht,
2019). Moreover, new forms of disinformation – so called deepfakes – are
especially effective in creating uncertainty (Vaccari & Chadwick, 2020) and
further research on fake news literacy should pay close attention to it.
Despite these limitations, our study delivers first insights into a highly
relevant topic by testing the relationship between news literacy, fake news literacy,
and fake news corrective action. It highlights the crucial role of developing
specific fake news literacy for enabling people to correct fake news. We need to
understand how each of us can take actions to fight disinformation. The findings
from our study highlight one important way to combat disinformation, and
provide a solid basis for futures studies in this area.
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